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1. Commercial & Cost Data
Tomorrow – Sept. 13, Space Cost and Economics, 10am-12:30pm
“An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS Program and 
Implications for Future NASA Missions”
2. Estimating Costs for New Elements from Data
Earlier – Sept. 12, Reinventing Space II, 3:30-6:30pm
“The Opportunity in Commercial Approaches for Future NASA Deep Space 
Exploration Elements”
3. Exploration Scenarios
Here – Sept. 12, Space Exploration, 7:30-9pm
“NASA Human Spaceflight Scenarios Do All Our Models Still Say ‘No’?”
Context
2
Data
Estimates
Architectures
“All our models say ‘no,’ even models that have generous 
affordability considerations.”
Elizabeth Robinson, NASA’s chief financial officer, 2011, The New York Times
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A Brief History of NASA Life Cycle Cost Analysis
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1969 Space Task Group
2004 Aldridge
2009 Augustine
2011 Greason
Most recently, LCC analysis has been avoided
• Constellation canceled (it’s own sand-charts used to show ≠ add up)
• Avoid “sticker shock”
• Long term uncertainty, LCC analysis perceived as unproductive
• “Capability Driven Framework” as substitute
Is the cure worse than the disease?
Neglecting to look long term with life cycle cost analysis “does not provide the 
transparency necessary to assess long-term affordability”; difficult to 
understand if NASA “is progressing in a cost-effective and affordable manner.”
-GAO 2014
A Brief History of NASA Life Cycle Cost Analysis
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The usual suspects – 5 (poor?) assumptions repeat
1. Budgets grow at a rate not supported by historical data while costs 
(inflation) increase at a rate equal to assumed budget growth
• Aerospace cost *inflation as an assumption, not an estimate
2. System annual ops always much less than annual development
3. 100% of funds from some programs end is available to another beginning
4. Funds easily moved around
• NASA Human space exploration & operations is the priority
5. Optimism – new programs are always different – especially useful when 
past data points are so expensive they would never yield attractive new 
data points without optimism
A Brief History of NASA Life Cycle Cost Analysis
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*…or what passes for vague notions about cost inflation in aerospace
Lets turn the usual assumptions on their head
• Go with history in assumptions
• Go with reference data in cost estimates
• Assume life cycle cost analysis can be productive and useful to many 
stakeholders
Method
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The opposite of the 5 usual suspects
1. Budgets increase at their historical rate – 1.95% a year (since 2003)
• Cost inflation from NASA New Start Inflation Indices, 2.5% a year
2. Historically, annual ops budgets about the same as in earlier development
3. Historically, ample doses of skepticism and rigorous assessment are justified 
around the notion funds from a program ending become wholly available to 
another starting
4. Avoid moving money around and across accounts, or making assumptions one 
area remains flat while another grows much faster
• Historically, creates the issue of making everyone who loses funds the enemy of the project 
receiving funds, undermining the kind of support needed to sustain the new program
5. Let historical reference data speak for itself – bad and good.
• Avoid fudge factors for optimism (“factor for management challenges”, etc.)
Method
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Data
• Tomorrow – Sept. 13, Space Cost and Economics, 10am-12:30pm
“An Assessment of Cost Improvements in the NASA COTS/CRS Program and 
Implications for Future NASA Missions”
Estimation
• Earlier – Sept. 12, Reinventing Space II, 3:30-6:30pm
“The Opportunity in Commercial Approaches for Future NASA Deep Space 
Exploration Elements”
Method – What data? What estimates?
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The views expressed in this analysis are those of the author(s) and do 
not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government or NASA.
The analysis that follows explores the life cycle cost of many scenarios, 
choosing none, to understand these relative to each other, using results 
to understand a variety of fundamental questions.
Forget answers a moment, lets go back to questions
Method
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Method – A Blank Cost/Budget Template
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2017 Human Exploration & Operations Budget ~ $9.3 BillionNASA Scenarios Model
Was Shuttle/Transportation Ops,  
Is Transportation/Development 
 
Mission Elements  
(to be defined) 
Budget Areas & 
Limits 
1. Combine what is certain enough with an understanding of budget areas
2. See what remains & what’s possible
The Baseline Scenario
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The Baseline Scenario, SLS / EUS and an Orion (every other launch). Productivity / benefit is = two launches of the SLS and one launch of Orion per year 
beginning in 2024. Payloads could be funded from post-ISS funds, in this scenario the white-space opening up after 2024 (Post ISS Funds $$$ Available). 
If the ISS continues until 2028, the transition line moves to the right, with a need to lower the SLS / Orion flight rate below 2 a year through that date or find 
other cost reductions to remain below the dashed (------) available budget line.
Requires these 
post-ISS funds to 
achieve two SLS 
flights per year
The Baseline Scenario + Upgrades → 130t Payload to LEO
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This is the same as the prior Baseline Scenario, except beginning an advanced / evolved booster development project after the end of the ISS to reach the congressionally 
mandated SLS 130t payload capability. This is also a capability required in the NASA Mars Design Reference Mission (DRM). The scale of the potential yearly cost for an advanced 
/ evolved booster development, in parallel to ongoing operations of the SLS, to take the SLS to a 130t payload capability (to LEO) is put here on a par with the original SLS annual 
development costs. This is in consideration of the potential extent and scale of new advanced / evolved boosters, similarly on a par with the SLS experience to date. It’s assumed 
the advanced / evolved booster is acquired with contractual approaches similar to past SLS approaches (partnerships, or partnerships and reusable advanced / evolved SLS 
boosters, are not considered here.)
Prior
+SLS redesign to 
increase payload
Requires these 
post-ISS funds to 
achieve two SLS 
flights per year
The Baseline Scenario + [Lunar Lander] (as Partnership)
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Baseline 
+Lunar 
Post-ISS
A Return to the Moon in 2037. In this scenario, an alternating SLS/Orion/lander tempo allows for a return to the Moon after completing a commercial lunar 
lander development. The nearer term SLS / EUS payload capability is adequate to achieve this type of scenario. Crewed lunar missions would occur once per 
year starting in 2037. As with previous scenarios, costs exceed budgets in the years before the end of the ISS indicating a need to reduce the flight rate 
before the end of ISS or find other cost reductions so these remain below the dashed (------) available budget lines.
The Baseline Scenario + [Lunar Lander + EUS] (as Partnership)
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Prior
+EUS → 
Commercial
This is the same as the prior scenario, except the EUS is a public private partnership rather than a cost-plus/sole source contract. This leaves room to 
grow in the near term, assuming the same annual budget levels as would have been available for a cost-plus/sole-source effort. There is also some room to 
grow in the far term, the white-space unassigned after 2028 (Post ISS Funds $$$ Available).
The Baseline Scenario + [Lunar Lander + EUS + Deep Space Spacecraft] 
(as Partnership)
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+Deep Space 
Crew Spacecraft 
→ Commercial
This is the same as the prior scenario, except here the deep space spacecraft is also a public private partnership. The new partnerships build off the 
knowledge gained in the Orion program and are open to existing US space industry partners in cargo or crew, the current Orion partners, or new partners. 
The basis of estimate for the costs of a commercial deep space spacecraft builds off the existing US commercial crew program.
Natural Trade-space Continuation → Commercial Heavy & Refuel
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Lunar Propellant LO2/LH2 Depot/CPS
The combined propellant depot and chemical propulsion stage is capable of holding enough O2 and 
H2 (100MT) to perform lunar missions requiring up to 4km/s of delta-v when used as a propulsion 
stage. From the 2011 NASA Propellant Depot Study / Courtesy Alan Wilhite.
Lunar via Single Commercial Heavy Lift & Refueling w. a Depot
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The “White-
space”, 
available but 
unassigned 
funding, can 
also serve as 
margin for the 
projects in the 
path chosen
A return to the Moon scenario using commercial / public private partnerships, a propellant depot, and reliant on the SpaceX Falcon Heavy launch 
vehicle. Productivity / benefit is = a lunar landing in 2025 and an operational capability to repeat these lunar missions at a pace of one a year.
Lunar via Multiple Commercial Heavy Lift & Refueling w. a Depot
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Multiple 
providers for 
competition, 
redundancy, and 
alignment of 
incentives
A return to the Moon scenario using commercial / public private partnerships, a propellant depot, and multiple competing commercial launch and propellant providers, of 
which at least one is in the 50t to LEO payload range. Propellant available at the depot is paid for by a customer (NASA) at ~ $7,000 per kg (in 2017 $). The productivity / benefit
is a lunar landing in 2025 and an operational capability to repeat these lunar landing at a pace of one a year. Different business case models might apply, with NASA at one 
extreme collaborating with individual elements in different business arrangements, launchers, propellant tankers (or both), propellant at the depot, or for development and 
operation of the depot, versus another extreme where NASA pays for propellant at the very end, when a stage arrives for refueling services.
Natural Trade-space Continuation → Baseline + Refuel + Farther
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A “Commercially delivered propellant option (EDS tanker derivative)” from the 2010 NASA review 
of its Mars design reference mission (DRM).
The Baseline Scenario Viewed as CAPABILITY → 1,000t
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Seen as human 
spaceflight payload 
funding, precisely this 
amount of funding is 
available for deep space 
exploration elements 
(like habitation or 
landers) to go in the 
transportation below in 
the same time.
Seen as capability, 
~every 4.5 years the two 
SLS launches a year 
have emplaced ~1,000t, 
some of which is 
spacecraft (Orion) mass 
(on alternate flights) and 
the rest of which can be 
propellant and hardware 
capable of leaving Earth 
orbit.
The baseline scenario seen as a capability for deep space exploration. The connection between any transportation capability and payloads as specific 
exploration elements (for example, habitation or landers) is apparent when looking at the whole as tonnage emplaced over any time by any supporting 
transportation system. The means, the supporting transportation system, and the ends, exploration elements leaving for deep space are by necessity fiscally 
linked. This scenario emplaces ~1,000t (metric tons) into low Earth orbit every 4.5 years, some of which is crew spacecraft, in this case Orion (4.5 times).
Commercial Heavy Lift & Refuel Viewed as CAPABILITY → 1,000t
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Seen as payload 
funding, precisely this 
amount of funding is 
available for deep 
space exploration 
elements (like 
habitation or landers) 
to go in the 
transportation below in 
the same time.
Funding is also 
available for this before 
this time.
Seen as capability, ~ 
every 4.5 years a mixed 
launch fleet has 
emplaced ~ 1,037t into 
low Earth orbit, of 
which 750t are 
propellant, some of 
which is spacecraft 
(commercial), and the 
rest of which can be 
propellant and 
hardware capable of 
leaving Earth orbit.
Deep space exploration as a combination of refueling and commercial launcher capabilities. The connection between any transportation capability and 
payloads as specific exploration elements (for example, habitation or landers) is apparent when looking at the whole as tonnage emplaced over any time by 
any supporting transportation system. The means, the supporting transportation system, and the ends, exploration elements leaving for deep space are by 
necessity fiscally linked. This scenario also emplaces a little over ~1,000t (metric tons) into low Earth orbit every 4.5 years, some of which is crew spacecraft, 
in this case commercial (4.5 times), and 750t of which is propellant and stages usable for going beyond low Earth orbit.
Mixing the Prior Two Scenarios → ~Baseline + Commercial Refueling
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Multiple 
providers for 
competition, 
redundancy, 
and alignment 
of incentives
Commercial stage 
(deep space / 
departure)
Commercial crew 
spacecraft (deep 
space)
~ Hybridizing the 
two prior scenarios, 
the SLS, but with 
refueling of Earth 
departure stages, is 
similar to the profile 
touched upon in 
earlier NASA 
studies.
Tankers (propellant)
Commercial 
Launchers
Hybridizing the prior two scenarios yields similar budget stresses as in the baseline scenario in a very conservative case. 
Even though there is no significant change to the overall budget outlook vs. the baseline scenario, a large market is created
for commercial propellant and launchers, here ~165t of propellant per year (~742t every 4.5 years). Given an emerging 
competitive market the costs here for propellant are extremely conservative, likely much lower. The propellant depot, 
tankers, launchers and commercial spacecraft and stages (in trade for the Orion transition) could all spur other private 
sector uses, especially for the refueling capability, lowering costs to NASA further.
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Any Scenario + White-space = Possibilities
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White-space outside of the means or capability to emplace mass in orbit are funds that can be used down assorted paths. When a scenario has more 
funds left over in the baseline budget outlook, budget growth lines consistent with historical data since 2003, more exploration paths open up versus fewer.
Scenarios – In Review
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Less 
Transformed
More 
Transformed
Fewer 
Options
More 
Options
Survive
Grow
• Long-term life cycle cost analysis for diverse NASA human space 
exploration scenarios is possible, practical and useful
Recommendation: Reconnaissance can and should look at many, 
different space exploration scenarios. 
Best practice: Delay design decisions as long as possible.
Conclusions & Recommendations
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• Do all of our models still say ‘no’?
No. Some models say ‘yes’.
Increasing space exploration ambitions squeezed under historical 
budget trends will cause a distribution of funding increasing NASA 
irrelevance.
Recommendation: We propose a steady transformation of NASA space 
exploration and operations funding towards more, smaller commercial 
/ public-private partnerships, favoring those with strong non-
government business cases.
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